William Bement, 27, was sentenced to 17 months in prison today for Facebook postings that threatened the lives of police and judges.

One posting suggested people “stop shooting up schools and start shooting cops in courthouses.” Another said, “Kill your local judges!!!!!!!.”

Bement made the postings on Feb. 5, shortly after Rocky River Municipal Court Judge Donna Congeni Fitzsimmons gave him probation.

Today, he appeared before Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold. Bement told Saffold that he was just venting and never intended for anybody to feel threatened.

“I was doing it for a shock factor,” he said.

Assistant County Prosecutor Jim Hofelich said someone else could have read Bement’s posting and acted on it.

Besides sentencing Bement to prison, Saffold also ordered him to receive anger- management and mental-health counseling.

1. ILLEGAL STOP OF PERSON OR VEHICLE – A driver cannot be stopped unless the officer has a reasonable and articulate basis to believe a law has been violated. An individual cannot be arrested unless a violation has occurred.
2. ANONYMOUS REPORT OF DRUNK DRIVING – A motor vehicle cannot be stopped because an anonymous citizen reported the driver was intoxicated.
3. WEAVING INSIDE MARKED LANES IS NOT ILLEGAL – Weaving without crossing marked lanes does not violate the law. A motor vehicle cannot be stopped for that reason.
4. LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST – A law enforcement official must have specific and articulable facts to support an arrest for DUI/OVI, or the arrest will be reversed and the evidence will be suppressed at trial.
5. PRIVATE PROPERTY – A driver who has not operated a motor vehicle on a public highway cannot be arrested for drunk driving on private property.
6. FAILURE TO PROVE DRIVING – An individual admitting to driving a motor vehicle, without more evidence, does not prove a charge of driving under the influence.
7. ABSORPTION OF ALCOHOL AFTER DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE – The prosecutor must prove that the blood or breath alcohol was over the acceptable limit (.08%) at the time the individual was operating a motor vehicle. Any consumption of
   alcohol after the driving but before the arrest will not sustain a conviction.
8. BAD OR INCLEMENT WEATHER – Weather conditions, including high winds, low visibility, rain, ice, etc. are options for a defendant to prove poor or improper driving or balance.
9. INTERFERING SUBSTANCES – Many over the counter products (such as cough drops, inhalers used for asthma, paints, finger nail polish, etc.) contain forms of alcohol which can contribute to false blood alcohol results, rendering the results to be invalid.
10. MEDICAL AND HEALTH PROBLEMS – Medical conditions with one’s arms, legs, back, neck, eyes and other conditions can affect the results of field sobriety tests, leaving the validity of the test results invalid.
11. ILLEGAL SEARCH – A law enforcement official is prohibited from searching an individual or the individual’s motor vehicle for a minor traffic offense without the driver’s permission or probable cause. All evidence illegally obtained by the officer is not admissible in court.
12. FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS IMPROPERLY ADMINISTERED – Field sobriety tests that are improperly administered are not valid evidence of intoxication (per the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration).
13. NON-STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS ARE INVALID – Neither the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) nor medical science consider counting in reverse, reciting the alphabet, or touching your finger to your nose as valid sobriety tests.
14. STANDARD FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING INACCURATE – The one-legged stand is only 65% accurate in healthy individuals. The walk-and-turn test is only 68% accurate in determining if an individual is under the influence. Individuals with injuries, medical conditions, 50 pounds or more overweight, and 65 years of age or older cannot be validly judged by such tests.
15. PORTABLE BREATH TEST IMPROPERLY ADMINISTERED – Manufacturers of portable breathalyzer equipment require a minimum of two tests to consider the results of such testing to be evidence.
16. PORTABLE BREATH TEST INADMISSIBLE – Ohio law prohibits the use of portable breath testing results as evidence at trial in an DUI/OVI/OVI case.
17. BREATH MACHINE NOT PROPERLY OPERATED – Failure to follow the specified protocols of the breath machine manufacturer in conducting breath tests will result in improper readings.
18. BREATHALYZER MACHINE MALFUNCTIONS – Malfunction or repair of breath testing equipment within 62 days before or after a suspect’s breath test may render such testing invalid.
19. BREATH TESTING IS INACCURATE – Most experts consider the taking of only one breath test to be unreliable.
20. FAILURE TO RECORD CERTIFICATION TESTS – Failure to include the value of the simulator solution used to test breath machines will cause test results to be inadmissible in court.
21. FAILURE TO PRODUCE DISPATCH TAPES – Most motor vehicle stops as well as police communications regarding the arrest of an individual are recorded on dispatch tapes. Failure to preserve said tapes and to provide same upon request may cause all evidence to be suppressed.
22. IN-SQUAD VIDEOS – Videos of a suspect’s driving and field testing are almost always recorded by a camera in the officer’s squad car. These recordings can often times be used
    to contradict an officer’s testimony.
23. BOOKING ROOM VIDEOS – Videos can and usually are taken at the police station. These tapes may reflect the suspect’s clear speech or good physical balance, which often times contradicts the officer’s testimony.
24. INDEPENDENT WITNESSES – Witnesses to an accident, bartenders, hospital personnel and others can often times provide evidence of a suspect’s sobriety.
25. EXPERT WITNESSES – Experts may be employed to review and testify regarding the validity of field sobriety tests, breath tests, blood tests, etc.
26. FAILURE TO READ SUSPECT MIRANDA WARNINGS – If the law enforcement official has not read Miranda Warnings to a suspect the statements made by the suspect cannot be used as evidence against the individual.
27. OFFICER’S PRIOR DISCIPLINARY RECORD – A law enforcement officer’s prior disciplinary record can be used to attack the officer’s credibility.
28. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS – Any misleading statements made by a law enforcement officer regarding the consequences or taking or refusing to take blood, breath or urine test(s) may cause the one year driver’s license suspension to be reversed and removed from the individual’s driving record.
29. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS BY POLICE OFFICERS – Any and all statements made by an officer (verbal, written, or testimony at previous court hearings) may be used to attack the officer’s credibility.
30. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXPERTS – If a prosecutor fails to disclose the State’s expert(s) those witnesses may be barred from testifying against the defendant.
31. FAILURE TO PROVIDE SPEEDY TRIAL – A trial for DUI/OVI must be held within ninety (90) days of the defendant’s arrest, or the case must be dismissed.
32. HOSPITAL BLOOD TEST INACCURATE – In healthy, uninjured individuals hospital blood test overestimate an individual’s true blood alcohol level by as much as 25%. Such hospital tests are not statistically reliable in severely injured individuals.
33. FORCED BLOOD DRAWS – A blood test cannot be taken against a driver’s consent where there has not been an injury involved or the results from said test(s) will be inadmissible. A new Ohio law coming in September, 2008 is attempting to change this!
34. LACTATE RINGERS – If lactate ringers are used by hospital staff in treating a patient, blood serum results will report falsely elevated and would, therefore, be invalid readings.
35. ALCOHOL SWABS – If a medical professional uses an alcohol swab when taking a blood sample, the results will be inaccurate.
36. BREATH TEST OPERATOR NOT LICENSED – If a breath test operator does not have a valid, unexpired operator’s license the breath test result is inadmissible.
37. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – A misdemeanor charge of DUI/OVI must be filed within eighteen (18) months of the offense.
38. FAILURE TO CONDUCT OBSERVATION PERIOD – Ohio law requires that a driver be observed continuously for a minimum of twenty (20) minutes prior to a breath test in order for the results to be admissible in court.
39. BREATH TEST DEVICE NOT APPROVED – A breath testing instrument must be listed on the Federal List of Approved Breath Evidential Instruments and the ISP approved list of devices or the results are inadmissible.
40. BREATH TEST OPERATOR LICENSE EXPIRED – An Ohio breath test operator must possess an unexpired operator’s license, or the breath test results are inadmissible.

Why was a lesbian couple’s marriage dissolution rejected by a Franklin County judge when the same court granted two gay men a divorce days earlier?

That’s the question Laura Christina Thompson and Evangeline Grace Roller are asking after Judge Jim Mason of Franklin County Domestic Relations Court refused on Wednesday to end their marriage. The Columbus women were wed in Toronto in 2007 and filed for dissolution on July 26; they were not represented by attorneys.

Mason, a former state representative, said he could not approve the dissolution because of Ohio’s 2004 constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. “Because same-sex marriages have no legal effect in Ohio (regardless of whether Canada authorizes same-sex marriage), the court is required to dismiss any dissolution or divorce proceeding requesting the termination of a same-sex marriage for lack of jurisdiction,” Mason ruled.

Thompson declined to comment on the decision; Roller could not be reached.

Mason’s ruling came just days after Judge Donald A. Cox, a private, court-appointed judge, approved a divorce for two gay men: Oleksandr Dzhembaz and Oleksandr Volkov, of Milford Center, Ohio. They were married in Linn County, Iowa, in 2009.

In his ruling, Cox determined that he had jurisdiction despite Ohio’s same-sex marriage ban. When a couple is married in a state that permits same-sex unions, he said, “Ohio’s statute merely states that the marriage has no legal force or effect in Ohio.” He said it does not prohibit Ohio courts from granting a divorce.

Cox also approved a same-sex divorce in March for two Columbus men: Jonathan E. Baize and Stephen J. Wissman.

Columbus attorney Thomas J. Addesa, who represented Baize in that case, said he has handled several same-sex divorces in recent months, and they were approved by the courts.

He said he was not involved in the two women’s case, but in his opinion, Mason was “dead wrong.”

“My argument would be the court does have jurisdiction because our statute and amendment say nothing about a divorce. … We need not invalidate Ohio’s amendment or statute to grant somebody a divorce.”

Addesa said he thinks Mason’s decision denies a constitutional right to equal access to the courts.

Ian James, co-founder of FreedomOhio, the group backing a plan to ask Ohio voters to repeal the ban on same-sex marriage, said rolling back the law is necessary to provide equal opportunity in the courts.

“The marriage ban not only forbids those who are in love from seeking a commitment to marry, but also has the unintended consequence of denying those who have fallen out of love the ability to divorce.”

The Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, the group that spearheaded the successful marriage ban, has argued that Ohio courts cannot grant same-sex divorces because that would, by default, acknowledge that the couples were married.

The Florida dad decided to take his custody case into his own hands, ignoring the ruling by the judge presiding over his divorce. While his actions did help resolve the dispute in his favor, it also ended with a jail sentence of 180 days. Not quite the bargain he was hoping for.

So what did the dad do to warrant such severe criminal sanctions? He made the mistake of ignoring a judge. Family law judges have tremendous power in custody cases and when they issue an order requiring specific action, failure to follow that order can result in an individual being held in contempt of court. In the Florida case, the father was ordered to enroll his son in a boarding school across the country. Apparently believing that he knew best, the father ignored the judge and instead consented to the minor son’s marriage.

The marriage was between the 16-year-old son and the 18-year-old daughter of the family’s long-time housekeeper. The young couple eloped to Las Vegas where marriage only requires the consent of one parent, which the father gladly gave. The result of the marriage was that it effectively emancipated the son, making any further custody disputes such as child support or decision-making power moot.

When word got out about what the man had done the judge was understandably livid. When handing down his sentence, the judge wrote in his final order that, “It is hard for this court to imagine a bolder, more egregious example of indirect criminal contempt.”

The son now lives in a penthouse owned by the father, and the father reported that he plans to appeal the decision sending him to jail. The moral of the story is clear: if your family law judge tells you to do something, do it, or else you might find yourself wearing stripes.

Source: “Fla. Millionaire Gets 180 Days for Contempt in Divorce Case for Permitting Vegas Wedding,” by Martha Neil, published at ABAJournal.com.

Under Kansas law, a doctor’s involvement shields a man from being held responsible for a child conceived through artificial insemination. At least 10 other states have similar laws, including California, Illinois and Missouri, according to the Kansas Department for Children and Families.

William Marotta and the couple he helped have a daughter didn’t go through a doctor, so the department is asking a state court to hold him responsible for about $6,000 that the child’s biological mother received through public assistance – as well as future child support.

The department also asked the court to appoint an attorney to represent the now 3-year-old girl, independently of her mother.

Marotta is asking that the case be dismissed, arguing that he is not the child’s legal father. A hearing is set for Tuesday.

Department spokeswoman Angela de Rocha said Wednesday that when a single mother seeks benefits for a child, the department routinely tries to determine the child’s paternity and require the father to make support payments to lessen the potential cost to taxpayers.

She argued that the law regarding artificial insemination is an incentive for donors and prospective mothers to work with a doctor.

“I believe that is the intent of the law, so that we don’t end up with these ambiguous situations,” she told The Associated Press.

Marotta, a 46-year-old Topeka resident, answered an ad on Craigslist in 2009 from Angela Bauer and Jennifer Schreiner, a local couple who said they were seeking a sperm donor.

After exchanging emails and meeting, Marotta and the couple signed an agreement in which the women agreed to “hold him harmless” financially. It also said the child’s birth certificate would not list a father.

But the state agency argues the agreement isn’t valid, because instead of working with a doctor, Marotta agreed to drop off containers with his sperm at the couple’s home, according to prepared court documents the department gave to the AP late Wednesday.

The women handled the artificial insemination themselves using a syringe, and Schreiner eventually became pregnant, according to the documents. The couple broke up in 2010, and last year, Schreiner received public assistance from the state to help care for the girl.

“My ex-partner and I wanted to have a baby,” Schreiner said in a written statement to the department in January 2012, also included in the department’s latest filing. “We were a gay couple so we had a sperm donor.”

Marotta told The Topeka-Capital Journal that he is “a little scared about where this is going to go, primarily for financial reasons.” His attorney didn’t return a phone message Wednesday from the AP, and there was no listing for his home phone number in Topeka.

Phone numbers listed for Schreiner and Bauer were either incorrect or out of service, and Schreiner did not respond to a message sent by Facebook.

The department first filed a petition against Marotta in Shawnee County District Court in October, asking that he be required to reimburse the state for the benefits and make future child support payments.

Along with the 1994 law regarding artificial insemination, the department cited a 2007 Kansas Supreme Court ruling. In that case, the court decided that a sperm donor who works through a licensed physician can’t legally be considered a child’s father – and doesn’t have the right to visit or help raise the child – absent a formal, written agreement.

However, that case involved a sperm donor who was seeking access to a child but had only an informal, unwritten agreement with the child’s mother. Marotta’s attorneys contend the state is reading it incorrectly.

Still, Linda Elrod, a law professor and director of Washburn University’s Children and Family Law program, said the law seems clear: Sperm donors who don’t want to be held liable for child support need to work with a doctor.

“Other than that, the general rule is strict liability for sperm,” said Elrod, who filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the Supreme Court case.

Randy Leite, dean of Ohio University’s College of Health Sciences and Professions, will oversee the evaluation of the project. State and local child support agencies hope to come up with ways to establish parenting time duties. “We want to see if parenting time orders have an impact on the level of compliance on the child support order,” said Corey Clark, director of the child support enforcement agency in Fairfield County. Under the current system, if a parent doesn’t pay child support, legal action can be taken, according to Leite, but if a resident parent doesn’t let the other parent see a child, “not much can be done.” By arranging for both child support and parenting time simultaneously, Leite thinks families will maximize shared parenting time. He also expects child support payments will be more consistent. The plan is to have a pilot program running in Fairfield County by the end of next year, adding the other counties thereafter. “The idea is for us to go to the courts or Job and Family Services agents and say, ‘Here’s a strategy that works for helping kids.’ That’s the hope anyway,” Leite added.

Story by associated press

[Cite as

In re M.I.S., 2012-Ohio-5178.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

No. 98138

IN RE: M.I.S.

A Minor Child

[APPEAL BY A.M.S., FATHER]

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case No. CU 10105512

BEFORE:

Boyle, P.J., Cooney, J., and Kilbane, J.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:

November 8, 2012

FOR APPELLANT FATHER

A.M.S., pro se

c/o 1243 East 99th Street

Cleveland, Ohio 44108

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE MOTHER

Thomas A. McCormack

The Superior Building

Suite 1915

815 Superior Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

{¶1}

Plaintiff-appellant, A.M.S. (“father”), appeals from a trial court judgment

finding that Ohio was an inconvenient forum to determine his motion for custody.

Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.

Procedural History and Factual Background

{¶2}

In April 2010, father filed an application in the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to determine custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2).

In his affidavit attached to his application for custody, father averred that he and mother

were “previously married according to Islamic Law.” Father averred in his Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) affidavit that the child was

born in Louisiana on December 26, 2006. The child lived with father and mother, M.S.,

in Louisiana from the time of his birth until May 1, 2009, when the parties separated.

The child then lived with father in Louisiana until July 2009, after which father moved to

Ohio with the child. The child lived with father in Ohio from July 2009 to January 2010.

In January 2010, mother came to Ohio to get the child. Since January 2010, the child

has lived with mother in Louisiana.

{¶3}

Mother moved to dismiss father’s custody case, claiming that the court

lacked jurisdiction, or in the alternative, moved the court to find that Ohio was an

inconvenient forum. In her motion, mother explained that she and father were never

married. She further stated that father “kidnapped the child to flee [Louisiana] to avoid

legal process at a time when [mother] was out of the house.” According to mother’s

motion, father hid his whereabouts with the child until she discovered that he was in

Cleveland, and Cleveland police helped secure possession of the child and return him to

mother.

{¶4}

In December 2010, the magistrate held a hearing. The parties agreed that

mother “shall have temporary custody.” They further agreed that father would have

parenting time as set forth in their agreement. The parties also agreed that Louisiana was

the appropriate forum to handle the custody case and that one of them would initiate a

custody proceeding before the next hearing. The magistrate issued a pretrial order,

setting forth the parties’ agreement and ordering that “one of the parents shall file an

action in Louisiana by the next hearing as this matter will be dismissed because Ohio is

an inconvenient forum.” The next hearing was set for March 2011.

{¶5}

The magistrate held a hearing as scheduled on March 22, 2011. The

magistrate found that pursuant to R.C. 3127.21, Ohio was an inconvenient forum. The

magistrate dismissed the case without prejudice. Father objected to the magistrate’s

decision, arguing in part that the magistrate dismissed the matter without a full hearing

and that mother had not filed a proper pleading requesting that the case be dismissed. In

September 2011, the trial court sustained father’s objections and returned the case to the

magistrate.

{¶6}

Upon remand from the trial court, the magistrate set the matter for hearing

in February 2012 “to determine if Ohio [was] the appropriate forum.”

{¶7}

The magistrate held a hearing on February 8, 2012, to determine if Ohio

was the appropriate forum. After hearing from father and mother’s attorney, the

magistrate concluded that Ohio was an inconvenient forum and that the parties had been

given sufficient time to commence a child custody proceeding in Louisiana. The

magistrate dismissed the case without prejudice and assessed costs to father.

{¶8}

Father objected to the magistrate’s decision, claiming, inter alia, that

because of “ineffective assistance of counsel,” his counsel had not properly included all

of the time that the child was in Ohio on his original UCCJEA petition. Father further

alleged that the magistrate failed to rule on the various motions he filed, as well as his

writ of habeas corpus.

{¶9}

After an independent review of the record, the trial court approved,

adopted, and ordered the magistrate’s decision into law.

{¶10}

It is from this judgment that father appeals, raising 15 assignments of error

for our review. Father’s assignments of error are lengthy and, thus, we will summarize

them as necessary. We will also group his assignments of error together for ease of

discussion and convenience.

Standard of Review

{¶11}

Unless otherwise noted, our standard of review is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision. A trial court’s ruling on

objections to a magistrate’s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Gobel v. Rivers

, 8th Dist. No. 94148, 2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16. Furthermore, when

reviewing the propriety of a trial court’s determination in a domestic relations case, an

appellate court generally applies an abuse of discretion standard.

Gray v. Gray, 8th Dist.

No. 95532, 2011-Ohio-4091, ¶ 7, citing

Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541

N.E.2d 1028 (1989).

{¶12}

An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude was unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment.

Blakemore v.

Blakemore

, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “Abuse of discretion” is a

term of art, describing a judgment neither comporting with the record, nor reason.

See,

e.g.

, State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362 (1925). “A decision is

unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.”

AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment

, 50 Ohio St.3d 157,

161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). Further, an abuse of discretion may be found when the trial

court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on

clearly erroneous findings of fact.”

Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401,

2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

R.C. 3127.21 — Inconvenient Forum

{¶13}

In his first 11 assignments of error, father contends that the trial court erred

when it determined that Ohio was an inconvenient forum to determine his custody

petition. He first argues that the trial court did not permit him to submit evidence on the

relevant factors under R.C. 3127.21. In his next ten assignments of error, father

essentially claims that the trial court erred by

not taking some action before it found Ohio

to be an inconvenient forum. We find no merit to his arguments.

{¶14}

R.C. 3127.21(A) provides that even if a court has jurisdiction to make a

child custody determination, it may decline to exercise that jurisdiction “at any time if it

determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of

another state is a more convenient forum.”

{¶15}

In determining whether a court is an inconvenient forum, a court shall

consider the relevant factors set forth in R.C. 3127.21(B):

(1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue

in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;

(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;

(3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the

state that would assume jurisdiction;

(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;

(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume

jurisdiction;

(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the

pending litigation, including the testimony of the child;

(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue

expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence;

(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues

in the pending litigation.

{¶16}

Here, after hearing from father and mother’s attorney, the magistrate found

that the child was born in Louisiana in December 2006 and that besides a period of time,

July 2009 to January 2010, the child had resided in Louisiana. The magistrate further

explained that at a December 2010 pretrial conference, the parties had entered into an

agreement where mother would have temporary custody and father would have parenting

time. The magistrate noted that the parties further agreed that Louisiana was the

appropriate forum and that one of them would file a child custody action in Louisiana by

the next hearing set for March 2011. The magistrate found that it had cautioned the

parties that the case would be dismissed if the parties failed to file the action. The

magistrate further found that mother filed an action in Louisiana, but was unable to obtain

service. The magistrate stated: “Certified mail was sent to father but was returned

marked ‘unknown.’ The address used was the address father had used on all of his

pleadings in this case. Notices have been sent to that address by the court and nothing

had been returned.”

{¶17}

The magistrate stated that she considered the factors listed in R.C.

3127.21(B), including (1) the length of time the child resided outside of Ohio, (2) any

agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction, (3) the nature and

location of the evidence required to solve the pending litigation, and (4) “the ability of the

court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to

present evidence.”

{¶18}

The magistrate also considered R.C. 3127.21(C), which requires the court to

“stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly

commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court

considers just and proper.” The magistrate stated that “the parties have had from

12/15/10 to 2/8/12 to commence an action in Louisiana,” and that “the court [had]

informed the parties that this matter would be dismissed even if no action was

commenced.”

{¶19}

The magistrate concluded that Ohio was an inconvenient forum and that the

parties had been given sufficient time to commence a child custody proceeding in

Louisiana. The magistrate then dismissed the case without prejudice and assessed costs

to father.

{¶20}

After reviewing the record, it is clear that in determining whether Ohio was

a convenient forum, the magistrate considered the relevant factors under R.C. 3127.21

and made findings of fact based on those relevant factors.

{¶21}

The trial court independently reviewed the magistrate’s decision, approved

and adopted it, and entered its final judgment.

{¶22}

With respect to father’s assertion that the magistrate did not let him submit

evidence on the relevant factors, we find that the record does not support his claim.

During the hearing, father kept attempting to argue the merits of the custody case, not

where custody of the child should be determined.

{¶23}

Regarding father’s arguments that the trial court should have taken other

actions before it determined that Ohio was an inconvenient forum, we disagree. The trial

court was fully within its discretion to determine first whether it had jurisdiction and then,

if so, determine whether it should decline to exercise that jurisdiction. We find no abuse

of discretion on the part of the trial court in adopting the magistrate’s decision.

{¶24}

Father’s first 11 assignments of error are overruled.

Remaining Issues

{¶25}

In his 12th and 13th assignments of error, father raises issues regarding

mother’s counsel having a conflict of interest in the case and claims the trial court erred

by not barring him from representing mother. Father did not raise this issue below.

Accordingly, we will not address it for the first time on appeal. Father’s 12th and 13th

assignments of error are overruled.

{¶26}

In his 14th assignment of error, father contends that the trial court failed to

provide him with effective assistance of counsel. “The Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of

counsel.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d

674 (1984). There is no constitutional right, however, to be represented by counsel in a

civil proceeding between individual litigants.

Roth v. Roth, 65 Ohio App.3d 768, 776,

585 N.E.2d 482 (6th Dist.1989). The right to effective assistance of trial counsel

attaches only to criminal proceedings and to proceedings for the permanent, involuntary

termination of parental rights.

See Jones v. Lucas Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 46 Ohio

App.3d 85, 86, 546 N.E.2d 471 (6th Dist.1988). This case does not involve the

termination of father’s parental rights. Father’s 14th assignment of error is overruled.

{¶27}

In his 15th and final assignment of error, father claims that based on the

cumulative effect of all of the trial court’s errors, his due process rights were violated.

After a thorough review of the record, we find no due process violation. Father can fully

litigate his claims against mother, just not in this state. Father’s 15th assignment of error

is overruled.

{¶28}

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of

the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., and

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR

A divorce may be granted for the following causes: [Based on Ohio Revised Code Section 3105.01]

• Incompatibility, unless denied by either party.
• Living separate and apart for one year.
• Desertion for one year.
• Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from which the divorce is sought.
• Adultery.
• Extreme cruelty.
• Fraudulent contract.
• Any gross neglect of duty.
• Habitual drunkenness.
• Imprisonment in a state or federal correctional institution at the time of filing the complaint.
• Procurement of a divorce outside this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is released from the obligations of the marriage, while those obligations remain binding upon the other party.